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Last week, a solo practitioner won a unanimous decision in the United States Supreme Court. The court held in Hall v. Hall that when one of several cases consolidated under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure is finally decided, the decision confers upon the losing party the immediate right to appeal – regardless of whether any of the other consolidated cases remain pending. This victory is remarkable considering that the majority of federal appellate courts had ruled the other way, and a group of retired federal judges filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to rule against the solo practitioner and his client.

BACKGROUND 

Hall arose from a family squabble. Defendant Samuel Hall, a lawyer, served as caretaker to his mother, Ethlyn Hall, who owned property in in the United States Virgin Islands. After falling out with Samuel, Ethlyn transferred her property into a trust and designated her daughter, Elsa Hall, as the successor trustee. Ethlyn sued Samuel and his law firm, alleging that they had mishandled her real estate holdings in the Virgin Islands (the trust case). When Ethlyn died, Elsa took Ethlyn’s place as trustee and as plaintiff. 

Samuel then filed counterclaims in the trust case against Elsa, alleging that Elsa caused Ethlyn and him to be at odds by taking advantage of Ethlyn’s alleged mental frailty. However, because Elsa was not a party to the trust case in her individual capacity, Samuel filed a new complaint in the same court against Elsa as an individual asserting the same claims he made in the trust case (the individual case).  
 

On Samuel’s motion, the district court consolidated the two cases under Rule 42(a). The district court held a single trial of the consolidated cases. The jury returned a verdict for Samuel in the individual case, but the district court granted Elsa a new trial. The jury returned a verdict against Elsa in the trust case, and she filed a notice of appeal from the judgment in that case. Samuel argued that the judgment in the trust case was not final and appealable because his claims against Elsa remained pending in the individual case. The Third Circuit agreed and dismissed the appeal. 

THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING

The Supreme Court granted Elsa’s petition for cert to interpret the term “consolidate” under Rule 42(a)(2) and its effect on a court dismissing one of the consolidated cases while the other remained pending. Significantly, the court noted at the outset that if the district court had not consolidated the trust and individual cases, there would be no question that Elsa could immediately appeal from the judgment in the trust case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 

Samuel maintained that Rule 42(a)(1) – which permits a court to “join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions” that “involve a common question of law or fact” – was useful in interpreting the meaning of the term consolidate under Rule 42(a)(2). He contended that subsection (a)(1) permits for a single case to lose its individualized character for all purposes, which includes an aggrieved party’s right to appeal an order disposing of one case while other cases remain pending. The Supreme Court disagreed. 

Rule 42(a)(2) provides that if “actions before the court involves a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions.” In 1813, Congress initially authorized the consolidation of cases by statute. Since 1813, the Supreme Court had interpreted the statutory term consolidate to mean “the joining together–but not the complete merger–of constituent cases . . . [and] emphasized that constituent cases remained independent when it came to judgments and appeals.” (Emphasis added). The court reasoned that because the Rules do not define “consolidate,” Congress presumably intended for the term to carry the same meaning and effect it ascribed to the term’s statutory equivalent for the last 125 years prior to Rule 42(a) taking effect in 1938. The Supreme Court found no authority to rebut its presumption, explaining that:

“No sensible draftsman, let alone a Federal Rules Advisory Committee, would take a term that had meant, for more than a century, that separate actions do not merge into one, and silently and abruptly reimagine the same term to mean that they do.”

It also found that the Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied Rule 42(a) did not suggest anything to the contrary to its interpretation. Indeed, the Supreme Court explained that when the Federal Rules Advisory Committee “intend[s] a new rule to change existing federal practice, it typically explain[s] the departure” in the Advisory Committee Notes, which “are a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a rule.” 

IMPACT OF HALL 

Hall has important implications for all future litigants who may seek to utilize Rule 42(a) for a number of different reasons – e.g., for convenience or to reduce litigation costs: 

  1. The Supreme Court made clear that its decision in Hall does not mean “that district courts may not consolidate cases for ‘all purposes’ in appropriate circumstances.” Yet, to what extent are cases consolidated for all purposes? Companies should expect this to be a hotly contested issue and for litigation to continue to develop regarding this issue. 

  2. Congress may (in the near future) amend the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure to define “consolidate” inconsistent with Hall. The Supreme Court itself noted that if its interpretation was not aligned with the Committee’s intent, then “the appropriate Federal Rules Advisory Committees would certainly remain free to take the matter up [with Congress] and recommend revisions accordingly.” Thus, Hall may not be the last that word on whether Rule 42 will alter the previously well-settled understanding of the consequences of consolidation.
DeAngelo LaVette, a law clerk at McDonald Hopkins, assisted with the writing of this blog
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